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Abstract 
 
Detection of Coached Malingering of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
Jennifer L. Guriel, M.A. 
 
Although assessing malingering is recognized as a challenge to mental health 
professionals who evaluate posttraumatic stress symptomatology, little empirical 
investigation into which factors may impact an individual’s ability to feign symptoms of 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has been conducted. This study utilized 113 
undergraduate students in a simulation design to examine the effects that traumatic 
exposure (i.e., a history of experiencing or witnessing a traumatic event) and coaching 
(i.e., providing participants with information on PTSD symptoms and strategies for 
avoiding detection on psychological validity indices) had on the ability to feign 
posttraumatic stress symptoms. Vulnerability of three different types of psychological 
assessment instruments to malingered PTSD was analyzed. The Personality 
Assessment Inventory, Trauma Symptom Inventory, and Miller Forensic Assessment of 
Symptoms Test served as the representative for each assessment type: general 
multiscale self-report, trauma-specific multiscale self-report, and interview, respectively. 
Overall, this investigation demonstrated that providing simulators with diagnostic 
information on PTSD symptoms and strategies for avoiding detection on psychological 
validity indices was effective in assisting simulators with presenting as if they were 
suffering from but not significantly exaggerating posttraumatic stress symptoms. This 
was manifest in group mean differences between coached and naive respondents on 
several validity and clinical scales across measures. Trauma history, on the contrary, 
did not impact simulators ability to feign PTSD symptoms in any meaningful way. 
Participants who experienced a traumatic event were not better able to feign PTSD than 
were those without any history of experiencing or witnessing a traumatic event. 
Furthermore, a positive trauma history did not mediate the exaggerated clinical 
presentation commonly seen with PTSD simulation research. Also, no interactions 
between coaching and trauma history were detected, suggesting that coaching, alone, 
accounted for these differences. Despite the coaching effects, 97% of all respondents 
were correctly classified as malingering. 
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Detection of Coached Malingering of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
 
During the past 20 years, research regarding the ability to detect malingering, the 
feigning of symptoms for secondary gain, in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
claimants has grown rapidly. PTSD is an anxiety disorder resulting from exposure to a 
traumatic event (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994). It is a diagnosis 
particularly vulnerable to malingering because it is characterized by a number of 
subjective symptoms and can be associated with reinforcing financial and personal 
gains (e.g., disability benefits; Resnick, 1997). PTSD is also characterized by a variable 
symptom profile and is highly comorbid with a variety of clinical and personality 
disorders (e.g., depression, substance abuse), making detection of malingering a 
challenging endeavor (APA). 
 
Overview and Assessment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
 
PTSD, in its current diagnostic classification (APA, 1994) is an anxiety disorder 
characterized by psychological and/or physical sequelae resultant from experiencing a 
traumatic life event.  According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-IV; APA) criteria (Criterion A), a traumatic event can be 
any instance in which an individual feels helpless, fearful, or horrified while experiencing 
or witnessing the perceived threat of death or serious harm to oneself or others.  
Exposure to such a trauma is the first of six criteria required for a diagnosis of PTSD. 
The PTSD criteria that make up the symptom profile contain 17 symptoms across three 
general categories: (Criterion B) reexperiencing of traumatic events (e.g., nightmares, 
intrusive thoughts; (Criterion C) persistent avoidance of trauma-relevant stimuli (e.g., 
avoidance of the trauma scene, emotional numbing); and (Criterion D) autonomic 
hyperarousal (e.g., sensitized startle response). The final diagnostic criteria for PTSD 
require that symptoms must be present for at least one month and that the individual 
must be experiencing functional impairment in at least one setting.  
 
Prevalence rates for PTSD are highly variable, ranging from 1% to 58% (APA, 
1994), primarily depending on the relative risk and the type of trauma experienced for 
the population sampled (Breslau, Davis, Andreski, & Petersen, 1991). For example, 
Blanchard and Hickling (1997) reported a 9% lifetime prevalence among motor vehicle 
accident survivors, while Kulka et al. (1990) estimated that PTSD rates in combat 
veterans are as high as 15%. Breslau et al. found that PTSD was diagnosed in as many 
as 80% of rape survivors.  
 
In a review of civilian-related trauma and PTSD, Resnick, Falsetti, Kilpatrick, and 
Freedy (1995) found that exposure to a traumatic event is relatively common (40% to 
70% with subsequent PTSD prevalence rates ranging from 18% to 28%).  Bernat, 
Ronfeldt, Calhoun, and Arias (1998) found that approximately 67% of college students 
had experienced at least one traumatic event. Of these, 12% met diagnostic criteria for 
PTSD. In the largest study to date on the prevalence of traumatic experience and PTSD 
(the national comorbidity survey), 60% of women and 51% of men between the ages of 
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15 and 54 were found to have experienced at least one traumatic event and 8% were 
estimated to have a PTSD diagnosis at some point during their lifetime (Kessler, 
Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995).  
 
Although a universally accepted “gold standard” measure for PTSD assessment 
is lacking, inclusion of a structured interview is widely recognized as a standard 
assessment method (e.g., Keane, 1995). Furthermore, the following guidelines are 
recommended by experts in PTSD assessment (Keane; Resnick, 1997): First, a 
detailed history should be obtained to assess premorbid functioning and to identify the 
presence of traumatic experience(s). Secondly, corroborating data should be collected 
from outside sources (e.g., physicians or caregivers). Third, empirically validated 
measures of PTSD symptoms (as well as related clinical and personality variables) 
should be employed. Finally, the patient should explain how symptoms affect 
functioning.  
 
The development of diagnostic and symptom-specific PTSD instruments has 
flourished since PTSD was first recognized as a legitimate diagnosis in 1980. PTSD 
assessment methods have included psychophysiological measures (e.g., Orr & Pitman, 
1993), projective tests (e.g., Frueh & Kinder, 1994), and symptom checklists (e.g., Foa, 
Riggs, Dancu, & Rothbaum, 1993). In addition, structured interviews (e.g., Clinician-
Administered PTSD Scale for DSM-IV [CAPS; Blake et al., 1997]) and uni- scale self-
report measures (e.g., Mississippi Scale for Combat-Related PTSD [MS-PTSD; Keane, 
Caddell, & Taylor, 1988]) are currently available to assist clinicians in the assessment of 
individuals presenting with posttraumatic symptomatology. Finally, clinicians regularly 
incorporate information from multi-scale self-report instruments (e.g., MMPI-2) in PTSD 
assessment (e.g., Elhai, Gold, Frueh, & Gold, 2000; Keane, Malloy, & Fairbank, 1984).  
 
Overview and Assessment of Malingering 
 
Malingering is defined in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) as “the intentional production 
of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by 
external incentives…” (p. 683). The defining feature of malingering is the inclusion of a 
motivational specifier, which necessitates that an individual be consciously aware that 
s/he is providing deceptive information in an attempt to receive secondary gain via 
external incentives (APA, 1994; Cunnien, 1997; Franzen, Iverson, & McCracken, 1990).  
 
Precise prevalence rates for malingering are not known at this time. Rogers 
(1997) reported that there are currently no available prevalence rates for malingering in 
non-forensic settings (i.e., in psychological assessment settings where there is no legal 
question involved). This is noteworthy because statistics from forensic evaluators may 
be spuriously inflated relative to those in non-forensic settings due to the adversarial 
nature that commonly accompanies such evaluations (e.g., Hickling, Taylor, Blanchard, 
& Devineni, 1999). Although reliable base rate statistics are unavailable, it is known that 
clinicians generally do not include formal assessments of malingering in their standard 
assessment protocols (e.g., Cunnien, 1997). The lack of a “gold standard” assessment 
instrument and the threat of client confrontation or legal consequences may be factors 
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that cause clinicians to be apprehensive when it comes to assessing for malingering 
(Hickling et al.; Koch, Shercliffe, Fedoroff, Iverson, & Taylor, 1999; McGuire, 1999; 
Resnick, 1997; Rose, Hall, Szalda-Petree, & Bach, 1998).  
 
Three research methods have been most commonly applied in studying 
malingering: (a) simulation designs, (b) known-groups comparisons, and (c) differential 
prevalence designs (for a detailed description see Rogers, 1997). Simulation designs 
are the most convenient of these designs. Simulations generally include an analogue 
setting in which (presumably non-disordered) individuals are offered a small incentive to 
respond to assessment material in a particular manner. Simulators are then compared 
to control participants and/or clinical criterion groups. Simulation designs offer maximum 
experimental control, but questionable generalizability because they often do not 
include clinical comparison groups (i.e., people who have been diagnosed with a clinical 
syndrome) (Rogers & Cruise, 1998).  Known-groups comparisons are defined by 
Rogers (1997) as those in which bona fide patients and malingerers are compared in 
terms of similarities and differences. They afford the greatest degree of generalizability 
to clinical settings, but are plagued by the challenge of accurately identifying and 
describing the known groups (i.e., persons who have responded dishonestly and those 
who truly have the disorder being investigated). Differential prevalence designs offer the 
weakest methodology by utilizing groups that are assumed to be different in their 
response styles (e.g., compensation-seeking veterans are often compared to non-
service-connected veterans because it is assumed that applying for disability benefits 
increases the likelihood of malingering). 
 
Coaching, or providing simulators with information about the disorder to be 
feigned and/or giving strategies to avoid detection on psychological tests, is a key 
element in malingering research. Traditionally, it was assumed that malingerers were 
naive to testing because they had not sought or been provided with information 
regarding psychological disorders or testing (Rogers, 1997). This notion has now been 
largely discounted (e.g., Elhai, Gold, Sellers, & Dorfman, 2001; Hall & Poirier, 2001). 
For example, Wetter and Corrigan (1995) found that nearly 50% of attorneys believe 
that clients should be informed about validity scales prior to psychological testing. It is 
now believed that persons motivated to simulate psychological symptoms may be well 
informed on both diagnostic symptoms and the design and scope of psychological 
assessment instruments (Rogers). 
 
Empirical investigation into the effects of coaching has shown that although 
providing disorder-relevant information (e.g., symptoms) has little effect on performance 
(Lamb, Berry, Wetter, & Baer, 1994; Wetter, Baer, Berry, Robison, & Sumpter, 1993), 
strategies for avoiding detection (e.g., avoidance of endorsing bizarre symptoms) can 
be quite useful to simulators (Baer, Wetter, & Berry, 1995; Rogers, Bagby, & 
Chakraborty, 1993). Providing information about validity scales designed to detect 
malingering is generally more helpful to simulators than is simply exposing them to 
diagnostic criteria for the disorder they are being asked to malinger (Rogers et al.). This 
has been demonstrated in both of the best validated measures of malingering detection, 
the MMPI-2 (Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemer, 1989) and the 
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Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS; Rogers, 1992) (Rogers et al.; 
Wetter et al.). Finally, clinical judgment is not always reliable or valid in identifying 
coached malingerers. For instance, Hickling, Blanchard, Mundy, and Galovski (2002) 
found that well-trained clinicians failed to detect malingering in all cases when they were 
unaware of the presence of a coached malingerer in their caseload for evaluating motor 
vehicle accident survivors presenting with PTSD symptoms. 
 
Importance of Assessing for Malingering in PTSD Evaluations 
 
Malingering is an important issue in the assessment of PTSD for a variety of 
reasons. First, PTSD is unique with respect to most psychiatric disorders in that it 
requires that there be a cause and effect relation between a traumatic event and 
subsequent psychological symptomatology. Because the current PTSD diagnostic 
criteria (DSM-IV; APA, 1994) are dominated by subjective experiences (e.g., intrusive 
thoughts, feelings of detachment), clinicians are forced to rely heavily on client self-
reports in arriving at diagnostic conclusions. This is complicated by the argument that 
PTSD is easily faked (Elhai et al., 2001; Frueh & Kinder, 1994; Lees-Haley, 1986). For 
example, Lees-Haley and Dunn (1994) found that 86% of untrained, nonclinical 
participants were able to endorse symptoms in a manner consistent with a PTSD 
diagnosis. Similarly, Hickling et al. (2002) found that 100% of professional actors, highly 
trained to simulate PTSD, were able to “fool” experienced clinical evaluators when the 
evaluators were unaware of the presence of simulators within their evaluation group. 
The malingering detection rate increased dramatically, however, when examiners were 
informed of the presence of simulators amongst their interviewees. In that case, over 
91% of the feigners were identified by clinical judgment. Unfortunately, despite being 
acknowledged as a serious threat to accurate diagnosis, malingering is often not directly 
assessed in PTSD evaluations (e.g., Cunnien, 1997). 
 
There are several reasons that an individual may be motivated to malinger 
PTSD. The primary motivation is to obtain financial remuneration (Lees-Haley 1992; 
McGuire, 1999; Resnick, 1997), from governmental agencies (i.e., Veterans or Social 
Security benefits; e.g., Mayers, 1995) or from civil litigation (e.g., Early, 1990). PTSD 
may also be feigned to receive medical or psychiatric treatment or to gain inpatient 
status (e.g., Elhai et al., 2001). Malingering PTSD could also allow the client to 
embellish victimization (e.g., Resnick) or to minimize or escape criminal liability (e.g., 
Baer & Miller, 2002; Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin, 1997). Finally, the 
potentially large incentives (e.g., monetary or secondary gain via attention, etc.) 
involved with PTSD claims may increase motivation to malinger, even in a person who 
would not ordinarily engage in deceitful or malevolent behavior. Rogers’ (1997) 
adaptational model of malingering in which the client has “substantial personal 
investment” and stands to gain considerably from feigning symptoms best describes the 
motivation in cases of feigned PTSD. 
 
Malingered PTSD may occur in three different ways. Clients may completely 
manufacture their symptoms (i.e., pure malingering), exaggerate the extent of their 
injuries (i.e., partial malingering), or attribute pre-existing symptoms to the current 
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trauma (i.e., false imputation) (Resnick, 1997). Unfortunately, such behaviors may not 
be uncommon. Hall and Poirier (2001) reported that all three types of malingering might 
be found during PTSD evaluations. In addition, Resnick cited a study in which 40% of 
those considered totally disabled (resultant from PTSD) who were receiving benefits 
showed no indication of actual disability. Clearly, there is a need to ensure that 
clinicians are properly trained and equipped to detect malingering during PTSD 
evaluations. 
 
Also challenging to clinicians is the notion that it is difficult to differentiate 
between malingered and genuine PTSD because a grossly pathological symptom 
profile (which may appear to be symptom overreporting), is believed to be associated 
with legitimate PTSD cases (Elhai et al., 2001; Hyer, Fallon, Harrison, & Boudewyns, 
1987; Resnick, 1997). The primary reason for this is the high comorbidity that PTSD 
shares with both clinical and personality disorders (e.g., depression, substance abuse) 
(Keane, 1995). Furthermore, PTSD often includes a variety of symptoms, resulting in an 
elevated overall symptom profile (Hyer et al.). These factors create difficulty in accurate 
diagnosis, particularly differential diagnoses. 
 
Empirical research into the assessment of malingered PTSD has targeted 
psychophysiological (e.g., Gerardi, Blanchard, & Kolb, 1989), interview (Rogers, Kropp, 
Bagby, & Dickens, 1992), projective (Frueh & Kinder, 1994), and uni-scale self report 
inventory (Morel, 1998) assessment formats. The most commonly studied instruments, 
however, are multi-scale self-report inventories (e.g., the MMPI and MMPI-2; Wetter et 
al.,1993). Another objective, self-report, multi-scale personality inventory, The 
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991), has recently gained favor for its 
good psychometric properties and ease of administration. To date, only three studies 
have examined the effectiveness of the PAI in detecting feigned PTSD.  
 
Using a simulation design, Liljequist, Kinder, and Schinka (1998) compared PAI 
profiles of alcohol abusing veterans, with (n = 20) and without (n = 30) PTSD to those of 
undergraduates instructed to malinger PTSD (n = 27) or answer honestly (control) (n = 
30). Simulators were provided with a “glossary of terms to provide them with uniform 
definitions of words used on adult personality inventories” and were permitted to refer to 
this glossary as well as a list of combat-related PTSD symptoms during testing. Veteran 
data were archival, collected during Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) screening. 
As predicted, the malingering students produced profiles with higher negative 
impression management (NIM) and malingering index (MI) scores than the other three 
groups, suggesting that these PAI validity scales may be effective in identifying 
individuals malingering PTSD.   
 
Furthermore, malingerers scored higher than controls on seven PAI clinical 
scales and both veteran groups had higher clinical scale elevations than controls. 
Although malingerers scored higher than those in the PTSD group on seven clinical 
scales, only two were those predicted to differentiate malingerers from PTSD patients 
(anxiety and schizophrenia). Notably, the malingerers did not score significantly higher 
than the PTSD group on the anxiety-related disorders, depression, or borderline scales. 
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Because these scales represented the highest elevations for the PTSD group and are 
thought to be critical to a PTSD profile (Liljequist et al., 1998), there is concern that 
distinguishing true PTSD patients from malingerers would be difficult using the PAI 
alone.  
 
 Calhoun, Earnst, Tucker, Kirby, and Beckham (2000) extended the work of 
Liljequist et al. (1998) by applying PAI LOGIT diagnostic rules to determine whether 
individuals simulating PTSD would meet diagnostic criteria. These rules are derived 
from empirical algorithms of DSM-IV diagnostic criteria and are included in the PAI 
Software System (Morey, 1991). Calhoun et al. compared 23 veterans with combat-
related PTSD (diagnosed by meeting criteria on the Clinician-Administered PTSD 
Scale) with 23 male undergraduates instructed to fake PTSD and avoid detection and 
23 men randomly selected from the PAI standardization sample to serve as a control 
group. Veterans and simulators completed the PAI and Mississippi Scale for Combat-
Related PTSD (MS-PTSD; Keane et al., 1988).  
 
 LOGIT diagnostic analyses correctly classified 83% of the PTSD group as 
meeting DSM-IV criteria. This analysis was designed to assess sensitivity, or the 
number of people who truly malingered and were identified as such, and specificity, or 
the number of people who responded honestly and were not identified as malingering, 
of the PAI in malingering detection. While no control participants were classified as 
having PTSD, 70% of the malingerers’ profiles yielded elevations sufficient to fulfill 
diagnostic criteria. When using the recommended cutoff score for non-clinical samples 
(> 8) the NIM scale identified 83% of malingerers. Unfortunately, it also misclassified 
65% of the true PTSD group as malingering. When the clinical cutoff was used (> 13) 
only 43.8% of malingerers were identified, but the false negative rate dropped to 35%. 
Liljequist et al.’s (1998) recommended > 3 cutoff was used for the MI scale. This 
resulted in the identification of 56% of the malingerers and 22% false negatives in the 
PTSD patients. Nearly all (91%) of the simulators scored above 107 (suggestive of 
PTSD) on the MS-PTSD and no differences were detected between the PTSD and 
student groups on this measure, suggesting that the MS-PTSD did not differentiate 
malingerers from true PTSD patients.  
 
Scragg, Bor, and Mendham (2000) reported that the PAI was useful in detecting 
feigned PTSD when compared to groups of true PTSD patients and controls.  After 
reading information about PTSD, 44% of simulators were able to complete the PAI with 
an elevated clinical profile. However, over half of those individuals were detected by the 
PAI NIM scale (T > 85).  Thus, the authors reported that, when using the T > 85 cutoff, 
the PAI was successful in identifying 80% of simulators who either failed to successfully 
produce a PAI profile consistent with PTSD or produced an elevated but invalid profile.  
In conclusion, based on these preliminary empirical investigations, the PAI may be 
helpful in differentiating between malingerers and honest responders, but not 
necessarily in distinguishing simulators from PTSD patients. 
 
Another multiscale assessment measure that may be useful in PTSD evaluations 
is the Trauma Symptom Inventory (TSI; Briere, 1995). The TSI is an objective, 100-item 
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self-report instrument designed to assess psychological symptoms commonly 
associated with traumatic experiences (Briere). The TSI is unique because it is the only 
PTSD assessment instrument that contains scales specifically designed to appraise  
response style. The TSI contains ten PTSD-relevant clinical scales and three validity 
scales (atypical responding, inconsistency, and response level), each with a mean of 50 
and standard deviation of 10.  The clinical scales include anxious arousal, dissociation, 
depression, sexual concerns, anger/irritability, dysfunctional sexual behavior, intrusive 
experiences, defensive avoidance, impaired self–reference, and tension reduction 
behavior.  
 
The susceptibility of the Trauma Symptom Inventory to malingering was 
assessed using an undergraduate simulator sample in a repeated measures design 
(Edens, Otto, & Dwyer, 1998). Students were asked to respond: (1) honestly; or (2) as if 
they had been involved in an automobile accident (n = 36 male; n = 59 female) or had 
been sexually assaulted (n = 60 females). All participants were told to assume that they 
were seeking civil compensation for psychological trauma and were provided with DSM-
IV criteria to assist in answering TSI questions during the malingering condition. 
Because the order of conditions was counterbalanced to control for order effects, formal 
analysis of order effects was not performed.  
 
Students with basic information about PTSD symptomatology produced elevated 
TSI profiles for all scales (indicative of trauma-related sequelae). When using the 
recommended cutoff score of T > 90 (Briere, 1995) for the Atypical Response validity 
scale, 73% of malingered protocols were incorrectly identified as being valid. When 
using a more conservative cutoff score of T > 61 (devised from distribution analysis of 
half of this sample), however, the following statistics were obtained: overall hit rate = 
85%, negative predictive power = 81%, positive predictive power = 91%, sensitivity = 
78%, and specificity = 92%. This cutoff score was cross validated and subsequently 
applied to a variety of clinical samples (including in- and out-patient cases with 
diagnoses including PTSD, mood disorders, and personality disorders) via archival 
data. This was done to assess the clinical false positive rates using the reduced cut-off 
score.  Although the ATR cut-off score of T > 61 had generally good specificity in clinical 
populations (false positive rates ranged from 6.3% to 18.9%), with undiagnosed 
outpatients the false positive rate was 55.3%. The authors speculate that this may be 
due to the fact that ATR elevations, like F scale elevations on the MMPI-2, can indicate 
a “cry for help,” or severe distress as well as malingering or exaggeration. In conclusion, 
the TSI is a promising tool in PTSD and malingering assessment, yet further research 
into its vulnerability to coaching is needed. 
 
 Unlike the TSI, the Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms (MFAST; Miller, 
2001) is not limited to use with PTSD evaluations. The MFAST was empirically derived 
to serve as an abbreviated measure of response style.  The MFAST was created to 
serve as an abbreviated parallel to the widely used Structured Interview of Reported 
Symptoms (SIRS; Rogers, 1992). Preliminary validational research on the MFAST has 
demonstrated that the MFAST is a tool that shows promise in accurately distinguishing 
between honest and dishonest response styles (Zapf & Galloway, 2002). For example, 
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in an initial investigation to determine the effectiveness of the MFAST in detecting 
malingering during disability screenings, Miller, Guy, and Davila (2000) found that 
malingerers (as defined by SIRS scores) earned significantly higher total MFAST scores 
than did honest responders. 
 
Guriel et al. (in press) employed the TSI and the M-FAST in a simulation design 
with undergraduate students to assess the impact of symptom specific and malingering 
strategy information on the detection of malingered PTSD. Participants who were 
provided with symptoms and/or symptoms and strategies were found to be no more 
successful at malingering PTSD than were those who were not provided with this 
information. While only two thirds of the simulators were detected as malingering using 
the M-FAST total score or TSI validity scales, nearly 90% were identified when these 
measures were utilized together. This study demonstrated the incremental validity of 
using multiple forms of malingering detection for PTSD research but the results still 
need to be validated with a true PTSD population.  
 
Purposes and Hypotheses 
 
 The importance of assessing malingering in PTSD evaluations has been 
demonstrated (e.g., Resnick, 1997) and it has been established that individuals who 
undergo such assessments are not likely to be naive to symptoms or psychological 
validity scales (Rogers, 1997). Nevertheless, there has been little empirical investigation 
into the impact that traumatic life experiences and coaching might have on an 
individual’s ability to successfully malinger posttraumatic symptomatology (i.e., present 
with symptoms while avoiding detection). 
 
For this study, a 2 x 2 (trauma history x coaching) design was employed. All 
respondents were asked to feign PTSD symptomatology, so all were attempting to 
malinger. A control group (comprised of honest responders) was not ultilized due to the 
homogeneity of such a sample in this author’s previous research (Guriel et al., in press). 
Independent variables were trauma experience history (presence or absence) and 
coaching (information provided or participants remained naive). Participants were 
divided into four groups. Two of the groups were comprised of individuals who reported 
having experienced a traumatic event. Those in the first group were not provided with 
coaching information and were labeled “trauma positive, naive.” The second group 
included those who reported a trauma history and received coaching information. They 
were referred to as “trauma positive, coached.” Participants in the third and fourth 
conditions reported a negative trauma history (i.e., never experienced an event that 
satisfied PTSD criterion A1). As in the trauma positive groups, half were provided with 
coaching information and half were not.  These participants were classified as “trauma 
negative, coached” and “trauma negative, naive,” respectively.   
 
This study was the first to examine trauma history as an independent variable in 
feigned PTSD. Furthermore, traditional coaching methods were expanded upon by the 
inclusion of both symptom-specific information and strategies for avoiding detection by 
validity indices. The study was designed to empirically answer the following research 
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questions. When participants are presented with an instructional set and instructed to 
malinger: 
 
(1) Are there differences between those who have experienced a PTSD criterion A-1 
traumatic event (i.e., experienced the trauma and those who have never experienced 
trauma in terms of:  
A. the ability to present a valid clinical profile consistent with a PTSD diagnosis on a 
general multi-scale self-report inventory (PAI)? 
B. the ability to present a valid clinical profile consistent with a PTSD diagnosis on a 
trauma-specific multi-scale self-report inventory (TSI)?  
C. The ability to avoid detection during a malingering assessment interview 
(MFAST)? 
(2) Furthermore, does coaching of symptom descriptions and strategies to avoid 
detection of malingering affect:  
A. the ability to present a valid clinical profile consistent with a PTSD diagnosis on a 
general multi-scale self-report inventory (PAI)? 
B. the ability to present a valid clinical profile consistent with a PTSD diagnosis on a 
trauma-specific multi-scale self-report inventory (TSI)?  




Since there is not a single profile that is generally believed to indicate PTSD on 
either the PAI or the TSI, the following operational definitions were used for the 
purposes of this study. For the PAI, clinical elevation was defined as having PTSD 
suggested in the diagnostic constellation of the computerized scoring report and 
presenting with a score above 70 (i.e., two standard deviations above the mean) on the 
Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma (ARD-T) scale. For the TSI, clinical elevation was 
defined as elevation at least one and a half standard deviations above the mean (i.e., 
65 or above) on at least two scales. In order to be considered valid, a PAI or TSI profile 
must not have included a significant (as defined by each measure’s guidelines1) 
elevation on any one of the validity scales. 
 
To maximize internal validity, a knowledge-based quiz was administered prior to 
the completion of the measures on which participants were asked to malinger. This quiz 
assessed the information comprehended by participants during the coaching video. It 
was expected that participants in the naive groups would score lower than people in the 
coached groups on the quiz. Coached individuals were predicted to score higher than 
naive participants, primarily because the coached participants were required to pass the 
test with a score of 90% or better, while the non-coached individuals did not have a 
requisite minimum score for the quiz. In fact, naive participants who scored above 90 on 
the quiz, however, were to be excluded from further participation based on the 
assumption that their high scores may reflect knowledge of PTSD that would render a 
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Since the MFAST has accurately differentiated between honest and malingered 
responses in the past (Miller et al., 2000), it was expected that those in the coached 
groups would earn lower scores (i.e., be less likely to be classified as malingering) than 
those in the naive groups. It was still predicted, however, that MFAST scores would be 
suggestive of malingering (i.e., MFAST total score > 5) for the majority of respondents. 
This prediction was based on the research of Guriel et al. (in press), in which there was 
a demonstrated tendency for nearly all participants asked to malinger PTSD to earn 
scores of above six on the MFAST.   
 
Participants in the trauma positive and coaching groups (i.e., all except trauma 
negative, naive participants) were predicted to present elevated TSI and PAI clinical 
profiles. Hypotheses concerning elevated PAI and TSI profiles were based on the 
previously summarized findings of Liljequist et al. (1998), Calhoun et al. (2000), and 
Edens et al. (1998).  It was also hypothesized, however, that those who are classified 
as “trauma positive” but did not receive coaching would present elevated validity scale 
profiles on the TSI, suggesting that they were feigning their reported symptoms. This 
would be consistent with the notion that even legitimate PTSD sufferers tend to present 
with seemingly overreported profiles (e.g., Elhai et al., 2001). Furthermore, it was 
anticipated that naive malingerers would be detected as malingering via their elevated 
scores on the PAI negative impression management and malingering index scales 





113 undergraduate students from a major Mid-Atlantic university participated in 
this study. Fifty-four percent of the overall sample was female and 93% of all 
respondents were Caucasian.  The only recruitment exclusion criterion was having 
participated in a similar study the previous spring (also conducted by this author) that 
may have familiarized individuals with the measures being used in this study. 
Participants were asked about this at the beginning of the session and were asked to 
leave before beginning in the event that they had participated in the aforementioned 
study.  
 
Participants were divided on the basis of their experience with traumatic events 
(as defined by the PTSD diagnostic criterion A1 in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994). Some 
people who experience a traumatic event do not experience acute peritraumatic 
distress, whereas others have intense negative emotional reactions at the time the 
event (Bernat et al., 1998). Because PTSD has been shown to develop (or not manifest) 
in both cases, simply experiencing a traumatic event was used as an operational 
definition for trauma positive history in this study. Those who were described as having 
experienced a trauma (i.e., trauma positive history) were those who would satisfy PTSD 
Criterion A1.  Respondents were not required to satisfy Criterion A2 of a PTSD 
diagnosis (i.e., experience feelings of fear, helplessness, or horror, or feel concern for 
the well being of self or others at the time of the event).  
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Participants were divided into four groups according to trauma (positive or 
negative history of experiencing a traumatic event, as measured by the Posttraumatic 
Stress Diagnostic Scale [PDS; Foa, 1995]) followed by random assignment into 
coached or naive conditions. Groups one and two were comprised of individuals who 
reported having experienced a traumatic event. Those in group one were not provided 
with coaching information and were labeled “trauma positive, naive.” The second group 
included those who reported a trauma history and received coaching information. They 
were referred to as “trauma positive, coached.” Participants in the third and fourth 
conditions reported a negative trauma history (i.e., never experienced an event that 
satisfied PTSD criterion A1). As in the trauma positive groups, half were provided with 
coaching information and half were not.  These participants were classified as “trauma 
negative, coached” and “trauma negative, naive,” respectively.   
 
All procedures were conducted with the approval of the West Virginia University 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). See IRB approved (HS# 15285) consent form in 






 Coaching stimuli consisted of video taped presentation (approximately 15 
minutes long) of information obtained from three sources: (a) information about PTSD 
and psychological test-taking strategies obtained from internet sites targeted for 
attorney use; (b) DSM-IV (APA, 1994) diagnostic criteria (presented in lay terms as 
translated by the author); and (c) specific strategies for avoiding detection as a 
malingerer as presented by Rogers et al. (1993). The videotape was a lecture-like 
format by a university professor using visual aids to present the aforementioned 
information. The naive groups viewed a video of equal length, but unrelated to 
malingering or PTSD. This was shown to control for equivalent time commitments in the 
naive conditions. This video showed the same professor lecturing on jobs for 
psychology graduates. In addition to viewing the videotape, participants were also 
provided with a handout summarizing the information presented. Handouts for the 
coached and naive groups can be found in Appendices B and C, respectively.   
 
 Quiz (knowledge test)  
 
 A quiz, developed by the author based on information included in the coaching 
stimuli, was administered following the video. (See Appendix D). This quiz was 
administered to all participants for purposes of comparing learning in the coached 
groups to base knowledge of PTSD symptoms and psychological test methodology in 
the naive groups. The quiz utilized a recall format and required participants to list, at 
minimum, the following PTSD diagnostic criteria: (1) trauma, (2) re-experiencing, (3) 
arousal, and (4) avoidance. The acronym BOSS was used to remind coached 
participants to avoid endorsing bizarre, obvious, stereotypical, or severe symptoms and, 
to pass the quiz, coached simulators had to list all four. If participants initially failed the 
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quiz, they were given additional time and were instructed to study from the handouts, 
provided by the author, summarizing the information presented in the video. They then 
had to re-take the quiz. This happened with only two respondents in the coached 
groups.  
 
Malingering Instructional Set. 
 
 All participants were instructed to malinger and were provided with the following 
instructional set: 
 
“For the remainder of the time that you are here, you are going 
to be asked to pretend that you were involved in a serious car accident. 
You had no emotional problems because of the trauma, 
but you are trying to pretend that you are suffering from 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
in order to get money in a lawsuit. Pretend that you could gain 
a lot of money (thousands to over a million dollars!!!) 
if you win your lawsuit. Pretend that your lawyer has 
sent you to have a psychological evaluation 
and that you will be taking 
some tests to see if you have PTSD. 
Please pretend that you have PTSD as you answer 
all of the questions that will be asked of you on these tests. 
Answer as you think someone with PTSD would answer.” 
 
While the Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale was used for screening 
purposes, all other psychological assessment instruments were utilized to obtain 
dependant variables. Detailed scale descriptions and psychometric information for each 
measure can be found in their respective manuals. Conventional cutoff scores (i.e., 
those recommended by the respective manuals) were utilized for all measures and 
scales with the exception of the TSI ATR scale. A cutoff of T>61 suggests malingering 
was used for that scale based on the findings of Edens et al. (1998).  
 
Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale2 (PDS; Foa, 1995). 
The PDS is a 49-item, individually administered, self-report screening instrument 
for adults. PDS items are based on DSM-IV (APA, 1994) PTSD diagnostic criteria. The 
PDS was designed to assist in diagnosis as well as to quantify symptom severity and 
functional impairment. Sensitivity (i.e., 82% of PTSD cases were correctly identified) 
and specificity (i.e., the absence of PTSD was correctly identified in 76.7% of sample 
cases) have both been demonstrated in PDS standardization (Foa, 1995). For the 
purposes of this study, the PDS was used as a screening measure to determine 
participants’ trauma history status. 
 
Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (MFAST; Miller, 2001).  
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The MFAST is a brief, structured interview designed to detect malingering via 
assessment of an individual’s general response style.  The MFAST consists of a total 
score and seven subscale scores. Total scores higher than five on the MFAST are 
suggestive of a dishonest response style. Preliminary MFAST validation studies 
revealed excellent sensitivity (1.00) and specificity (.93) using a 51% malingering base 
rate (Miller, 2001).The MFAST was utilized to assess the test’s efficacy in correctly 
identifying malingering when coaching and trauma history challenges are present.  
 
Trauma Symptom Inventory (TSI) (Briere, 1995). 
 
The TSI is an objective, 100-item self-report, multiscale instrument designed to 
assess psychological symptoms commonly associated with traumatic experiences 
(Briere, 1995). All TSI items are presented in a four-point, Likert-type format ranging 
from never to often. The TSI contains ten clinical and three validity scales, each with T-
scores more than one and a half standard deviations above the mean (T > 65) 
suggestive of clinical elevation. High internal consistency has been demonstrated with 
the TSI, with the median alpha coefficient for all scales at .86 (Briere, 1995).  
Discriminant function analysis revealed that all TSI scales were associated with PTSD 
and that an optimally weighted combination of TSI scales yielded a positive predictive 
power of 92% and a negative predictive power of 91%. The TSI was used here in an 
attempt to collect more data to better understand the strengths and limitations of this 
relatively new measure of trauma symptomatology.                                        
                                                                                                                                                        
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) (Morey, 1991). 
 
The PAI is a multiscale, objective personality inventory containing a total of 22 
non-overlapping clinical, treatment, interpersonal, and validity scales (Morey, 1991). 
The PAI is comprised of 344 items, each scored on a four-point, Likert-type scale (not at 
all true to very true). All PAI scales use a T-score profile system. Elevations more than 
two standard deviations above the mean (T > 70) are considered significantly elevated. 
Initial validation revealed that the overall psychometric properties of the PAI are sound, 
with a median alpha for the clinical and validity scales being .81 (Morey). More 
specifically, alpha coefficients for the anxiety related disorders (ARD) scale and ARD-
trauma subscale are .76 and .81, respectively (Morey). The PAI was included because 




Recruitment and Screening. 
 
Participants were recruited via television advertisement, memos posted at the 
university, and from undergraduate psychology courses. (See advertisement in 
Appendix E). Participants were invited to participate in a one- to two-hour research 
study to earn extra course credit with the potential to earn up to $50.00 via the cash 
lottery. Interested persons called or emailed the author to schedule a participation 
appointment.   
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Laboratory Participation Phase. 
 
The laboratory phase was conducted within the psychology department on the 
campus of a major mid-Atlantic university. The procedure was similar with regard to 
time and effort required of each participant. Participation duration was approximately 
two hours. Each student received extra course credit points for participation. Although 
participants were told that only “successful malingerers” would be eligible for an 
additional cash prize (i.e., cash prize was used as an incentive), all who participated 
were entered into a lottery for one of four $50.00 cash prizes. Winners came to claim 
their prize, in cash, from the author. Each was provided with a receipt.  
 
The laboratory phase consisted of six distinct tasks: (1) explanation of study and 
provision of informed consent; (2) completion of the Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
Diagnostic Scale [PDS]; (3) viewing of a videotaped presentation (either coaching 
instructions or the time-matched, irrelevant substitute); (3) successful completion of the 
quiz (i.e., internal validity check to ensure that coached participants attended to the 
coaching stimuli); (4) completion of the Trauma Symptom Inventory (TSI); (5) 
completion of the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI); and (6) Participation in the 
Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (MFAST) interview. Tasks four through 
six were counterbalanced to minimize order effects. Specifically, an equal number of 
participants from each group completed the M-FAST, TSI, or PAI first, second, or third 
with the other two tests alternated to include all six possible order combinations. 
 
For the purpose of group assignment, all prospective participants were assessed 
to determine whether they met PTSD criterion A1 (i.e., experienced a traumatic event). 
This was done via the Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, 1995). All 
participants completed at least a portion of the PDS. If an individual satisfied PTSD 
criterion A1 (based on their answers to the initial question set), the measure was 
completed in the usual manner to further assess for trauma-related symptomatology. 
Individuals who did not satisfy PTSD criterion A (i.e., answered “no” to all events in the 
initial question set) did not complete PDS questions about symptom presence or 
severity or impairment. After completing the PDS, participants were randomly assigned 
to either the informed or naive coaching conditions.  
 
Participation occurred in a small group format and was coordinated by the author 
with the assistance of two undergraduate research assistants. Participants provided 
consent, completed the PDS, viewed the videotape, and completed self-report 
measures in the group format. MFAST interviews were conducted individually in an 
adjacent room within the laboratory proper. Occasionally, the M-FAST interviewer may 
have been aware of the participant’s trauma history or coaching status. For this reason, 
it cannot be said that interviewers were masked to independent variable conditions.  
 
 Following completion of all tasks participants were provided with extra credit 
slips.  Cash lottery prizes were awarded after each quarter of the data had been 
collected (i.e., one prize was awarded after 25% of the data were collected, another 
after 50%, etc.).  
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 Planned Analyses 
 
Data collected from this 2 x2 design (trauma exposure x coaching) was analyzed 
using SPSS software (version 11). Each of the four groups was compared to one 
another on the following categories of dependent measures: (1) PAI clinical and validity 
sale scores, (2) TSI clinical and validity scale scores, and (3) MFAST total and subscale 
scores. Multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) were used for continuous data, 
while Pearson’s Chi2 analyses3 were conducted for dichotomous variables. Data were 
analyzed for main effects and interactions. To determine if several important 
demographic characteristics, including type of trauma experienced and frequency and 
severity of reported symptoms (where applicable) had an impact on the results, 
MANOVA and Pearson’s Chi2 analyses were performed on these data as well.  
Variables analyzed in this manner included: (1) PDS diagnosis (presence or absence of 
PTSD), severity, and impairment; (2) Demographic variables; and (3) nature (i.e., what 
type) and time (i.e., how long ago) of traumatic event. If omnibus differences emerged, 
subsequent Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVAs) were to be performed. 
 
Specific analyses are described below: 
 
To test the hypothesis that trauma positive participants would score higher than 
trauma negative participants on subscale ARD-T of the PAI, the percentage of those 
above T = 70 were compared to the percentage of those below T = 70 using a 
Pearson’s Chi2 analysis. To test the hypothesis that trauma positive participants would 
be suggested for an Axis I PTSD diagnosis by the PAI interpretive report more often 
than would trauma negative participants, the percentage of those who had PTSD 
suggested in the diagnostic constellation was compared to the percentage of those who 
did not have PTSD suggested as a diagnosis using a Pearson’s Chi2 analysis. To test 
the hypothesis that trauma positive participants would be more likely than trauma 
negative participants to present at least two clinical scale elevations on the TSI, the 
percentage of those scoring above T = 65 on at least two clinical scales was compared 
to the percentage of those who failed to present at least two clinical scale elevations on 
the TSI using a Pearson’s Chi2 analysis. 
 
To test the hypothesis that coached participants would be better able to present with 
valid profiles than naive participants on the MFAST, the percentage of those who 
scored below 6 on the MFAST total (classified as “honest” responders) was compared 
to the percentage of those who scored above 5 on the total score (suggesting 
malingering) using a Pearson’s Chi2 analysis. To test the hypothesis that coached 
participants would be better able to present with valid profiles than naive participants on 
the PAI, the percentage of those who did not present with any validity scale elevations 
above suggested cutoffs was compared to the percentage of those who scored above 
suggested cutoffs on any of the PAI validity indices (suggesting malingering) using a 
Pearson’s Chi2 analysis. To test the hypothesis that coached participants would be 
better able to present with valid profiles than naive participants on the TSI, the 
percentage of those who failed to present with any validity scale elevations above 
suggested cutoffs was compared to the percentage of those who scored above 
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suggested cutoffs on any of the TSI validity indices (suggesting malingering) using a 
Pearson’s Chi2 analysis.  
 
Furthermore, to test the hypothesis that coached participants would score higher 
than naive participants on subscale ARD-T of the PAI, the percentage of those who 
scored above T = 70 was compared to the percentage of those who scored below T = 
70 using a Pearson’s Chi2 analysis. To test the hypothesis that coached participants 
would be suggested for an Axis I PTSD diagnosis by PAI scoring interpretation more 
often than would naive participants, the percentage of those who had PTSD suggested 
in the diagnostic constellation was compared to the percentage of those who did not 
have PTSD suggested as a diagnosis using a Pearson’s Chi2 analysis. To test the 
hypothesis that coached participants would be more likely than naive participants to 
present with at least two clinical scale elevations on the TSI, the percentage of those 
who scored above T = 65 on at least two clinical scales was compared to the 
percentage of those who failed to present at least two clinical scale elevations on the 
TSI using a Pearson’s Chi2 analysis. Finally, the Eta2 correlation ratio was used to 




Results of Demographic Data 
 
 Simulators (N = 113) were undergraduate students enrolled in psychology 
courses (n = 31 trauma positive, coached, n = 35 trauma positive, naive, n = 25 trauma 
negative, coached, and n = 22 trauma negative, naive). Fifty-four percent of the overall 
sample was female and the majority (93%) of all respondents were Caucasian.  No 
differences were found on demographic variables and randomly assigned coaching 
status, so demographic data did not impact later parametric or nonparametric analyses.  
 
Results of Trauma History Data 
 
The Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS) was used to confirm trauma 
experience history. Those who endorsed experiencing at least one traumatic event on 
the PDS were considered to be trauma positive. To be labeled trauma negative, a 
respondent must have endorsed no traumatic event experience on either the 
demographic or PDS screeners.  
 
For those who were trauma positive, PDS symptom and severity answers were 
recoded and assessed in terms of: (1) the nature of the event, (2) the time frame for 
when the event had occurred, (3) whether or not they met criterion B (re-experiencing) 
of PTSD diagnostic criteria, (4)  whether or not they met criterion C (avoidance) of 
PTSD diagnostic criteria, (5) whether or not they met criterion D (arousal) of PTSD 
diagnostic criteria, (6) whether or not they met all three criteria (B, C, and D) of PTSD 
diagnostic criteria, (7) whether or not they endorsed at least one impairment item to 
suggest that their symptoms affected their daily functioning, (8) whether or not the PDS 
would be suggestive of PTSD (i.e., meeting all three criteria and having at least one 
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area of impairment), and (9) for those who did have PTSD suggested, what the severity 
of their symptoms was.  
 
These nine recoded data were then compared to coaching status using 
Pearson’s Chi2 analyses. This was done to ensure that there were no differences within 
the trauma positive group that might confound subsequent analyses. No differences 
were found and it was concluded that trauma positive, coached individuals were not 
significantly different from trauma positive, naive participants based on PDS variables. 
Of the trauma positive individuals, 41% listed an accident as the event that “bothers you 
the most” and six months to three years was the most frequently endorsed time frame 
(44%) when asked “how long ago did the traumatic event happen?”  
 
Sixty-one percent of trauma positive, naive participants satisfied criterion B (re-
experiencing), while 59% of trauma positive, coached respondents did the same. For 
criterion C (avoidance), the percentages of those satisfying diagnostic requirements 
were as follows: trauma positive, naive 46% and trauma positive, coached 42%. For 
arousal (criterion D), 52% of the trauma positive, naive and 47% of the trauma positive, 
coached participants met diagnostic standards. When examining which trauma positive 
respondents would meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD (as defined by meeting criteria B, 
C, and D and endorsing some level of impairment from these symptoms), 33% of the 
naive and 21% of the coached participants were found to be endorsing symptoms which 
might warrant a PTSD diagnosis.   
 
In order to determine if differences in severity of PTSD symptoms within the 
trauma positive groups were significant, the trauma positive participants were divided 
into three groups based on their PDS Total score (determined by adding responses for 
all items for which respondents rated their problems [items 22-38]).  Those with scores 
of 0 to 2 were considered mildly bothered by their symptoms. Those with scores 
between 3 and 8 were considered moderate and those with scores above 9 were 
labeled as severely disturbed by posttraumatic stress symptoms. For trauma positive, 
naive respondents’ classifications, 34% were mild, 23% were moderate, and 43% were 
severe. Trauma positive, coached respondents were classified as follows: 45% mild, 
39% moderate, and 16% severe.  Pearson’s Chi2 analyses were not significant when 
comparing these groups.  
 
Interrater Reliability and Internal Validity Analyses 
 
Analyses were conducted to ensure reliable administration of the M-FAST. Inter-
rater reliability was assessed for 10 (across groups and M-FAST administrators) of the 
113 M-FAST protocols. To examine inter-rater reliability, the administrator scored the M-
FAST in the room with the participant, while an independent observer scored the M-
FAST from behind a one-way mirror. Pearson product moment correlations were 
conducted for the M-FAST Total score yielding a perfect inter-rater reliability of 1.0. 
Furthermore, every score was a match, yielding absolute scoring agreement. 
 
Furthermore, a Pearson’s Chi2 analysis was conducted to determine whether the 
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M-FAST administrator (there were four different administrators) had any effect on 
scores or malingering classification. Although the administrator did affect some 
individual scales, who gave the M-FAST interview did not have an impact on the 
likelihood for malingering success or the final malingering classification. Because the 
assignment of administrators to participants was done in a non-random sequence (i.e., 
there was no attempt to insure that all administrators interviewed equal numbers of 
respondents from each group) and because there was perfect inter-rater reliability for 
the M-FAST, it is believed that these were spurious differences.   
 
Given that participants were given the TSI, PAI, and M-FAST in a 
counterbalanced manner (i.e., one third of the participants in each of the four groups 
completed the TSI, M-FAST, or PAI first, second, or third in alternating fashion), no 
formal testing for order effects was performed.  
 
Finally, in order to insure that naive simulators did not have any substantial 
knowledge of PTSD, their quiz scores were examined. None of these simulators scored 
well enough to meet the quiz criteria that the coached participants were held to (e.g., 
scoring 90% or better). More specifically, the highest score quiz from any naive 
participant was six (trauma positive, naive M =  2.54, SD = 1.36; trauma negative, naive 
M = 1.77, SD = 1.23), whereas the lowest score for any coached individual was ten 
(trauma positive, coached M = 10.55, SD = .51; trauma negative, coached M = 10.60, 
SD = .50).  Therefore, the participants who did not receive coaching were considered 
psychiatrically naive, or unfamiliar with PTSD symptomatology, and none had to be 
excluded from subsequent analyses. 
 
Analyses of Validity Scales 
 
Validity scale scores for the M-FAST, TSI, and PAI are summarized in Table 1. 
Omnibus differences are reported in Table 1, while main effect results for coaching are 
summarized in Table 2. Means are shown in Figure 1. There were no main effects for 
trauma history or interactions of coaching and trauma history for any of the validity 
scales. Multivariate analyses of variance were conducted to examine differences 
between groups on all TSI, PAI, and M-FAST validity and total scores. Because there 
were unequal numbers of participants in each cell, the general linear model (GLM) was 
utilized for all multivariate analyses.  
 
A significant effect was found for the M-FAST total score indicating omnibus 
differences among the groups, F(3, 112) = 5.82, p < .01. It is noteworthy that although 
the coached participants had lower M-FAST Total scores than did the naive simulators, 
mean scores for all four groups were above the M-FAST cutoff (5), indicating that 
malingering would have been suggested by the M-FAST for most respondents.  This 
indicates that the M-FAST was effective in correctly classifying malingerers, even when 
presented with a coaching challenge. 
 
Significant omnibus differences also occurred for TSI Atypical Responding (ATR) 
and Response Level (RL) validity scale scores: F(3, 112) = 9.59, p < .001, and F(3, 112) 
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= 6.76, p < .001, respectively. There were no omnibus differences for the TSI 
Inconsistency (INC) scale. Coached simulators produced lower group mean scores than 
naive participants on the TSI ATR scale, F(1, 112) = 27.57, p < .001, suggesting those 
who received information about PTSD and psychological validity indices were less likely 
to report atypical PTSD symptoms than were those who did not have access to this 
information. On the TSI RL scale, on the other hand, naive respondents had lower 
group means than did the coached participants, F(1, 112) = 17.39, p < .001.  
 
For the PAI validity scales, omnibus differences were present for the Negative 
Impression Management, F(3, 112) = 8.03, p < .001,  Positive Impression Management, 
F(3, 112) = 7.40, p < .001, and Malingering Index, F(3, 112) = 6.30, p < .001, scales. No 
omnibus differences emerged for the PAI Inconsistency or Infrequency scales. Coached 
simulators scored lower than naive participants on the NIM and MI scales: [F(1, 112) = 
23.06, p < .001 and F(1, 112) = 18.06, p < .001]. Naive respondents had lower group 
mean scores than coached, however, on the PAI PIM scale, F(1, 112) = 17.18, p < .001. 
 
Analyses of TSI Clinical Scales 
 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to examine 
differences with regard to the TSI clinical scales. Overall differences were detected for 
coaching, F(3, 112) = 3.842, p < .001 (Eta2 = .340), but not for trauma or the interaction 
of coaching and trauma. Omnibus differences are reported in Table 3 and means are 
displayed in Figure 2. Significant omnibus differences were found for all ten TSI clinical 
scales. Furthermore, subsequent One-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) revealed 
that for each of the TSI clinical scales, coached participants produced significantly lower 
group means than did naive simulators. Main effect results for TSI clinical scales by 
coaching are shown in Table 4. No main effects for trauma history or interactions were 
found. This indicates that not only did coaching lead to lower TSI clinical elevations but 
also that trauma history did not have any impact on TSI clinical scores.   
 
In order to compare how likely groups were to have significantly elevated TSI 
clinical scales, data were recoded and categorized as either above or below clinical 
cutoffs (T=65). The percentage of those who produced elevations in the coached group 
was then compared the percentage of those who produced elevations in the naive 
group using Pearson’s Chi2 analyses. These results are summarized in Table 5.  
 
Consistent with the TSI main effects results, a lower percentage of those in the 
coached group had TSI clinical scale elevations than did naive simulators for the 
following clinical scales: Anxious Arousal, Depression, Anger/Irritability, Intrusive 
Experiences, Defensive Avoidance, Dissociation, Sexual Concerns, Impaired Self-
Reference, and Tension Reduction Behavior. The same procedure was repeated to 
compare those in the trauma positive and trauma negative groups but no differences 
were present for these comparisons. (See Table 6). 
 
Analyses of PAI Clinical, Treatment, and Interpersonal Scales 
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A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was also conducted to examine 
differences with regard to PAI clinical, treatment, and interpersonal scales. Similar to the 
TSI results, overall differences were detected for coaching, F(3, 112) = 2.047, p < .01 
(Eta2 = .364), but not for trauma or the interaction of coaching and trauma. These results 
can be found in Table 7 and means can be seen in Figure 3. No omnibus differences 
were detected for PAI Alcohol Problems or Drug Problems clinical scales, Treatment 
Rejection treatment scale, or Dominance or Warmth interpersonal scales. Differences 
were present for all other scales: Somatic Complaints, Anxiety, Anxiety Related 
Disorders, Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma Subscale, Depression, Mania, Paranoia, 
Schizophrenia, Borderline Features, Antisocial Features, Aggression, Suicidal Ideation, 
Stress, and Nonsupport.  
 
Corresponding  ANOVAs revealed that for each of the following PAI clinical 
scales, coached participants had significantly lower group mean scores than did naive 
simulators: Somatic Complaints, Anxiety, Anxiety Related Disorders, Anxiety Related 
Disorders, Trauma Subscale, Depression, Mania, Paranoia, Schizophrenia, Borderline 
Features, Antisocial Features, Alcohol Problems, Drug Problems, Aggression, Suicidal 
Ideation, Stress, and Nonsupport. Naive participants had lower group means than did 
coached students on the PAI Warmth interpersonal scale.  No main effects for trauma 
or interactions were found for any of the PAI clinical, treatment, or interpersonal scales. 
 
In order to compare how likely groups were to have significantly elevated PAI 
clinical scales, data were recoded and categorized as either above or below clinical 
cutoffs (T=70). The percentage of those who produced elevations in the coached group 
was then compared the percentage of those who produced elevations in the naive 
group using Pearson’s Chi2 analyses. These results are summarized in Table 9. Similar 
to the PAI main effects results, naive participants were generally more likely than 
coached simulators to have elevated responses on several PAI clinical, treatment, and 
interpersonal scales.  
 
No differences were found for the Mania or Antisocial clinical scales or for the 
Treatment Rejection treatment scale or the Dominance or Warmth interpersonal scales. 
Differences were present for all other scales: Somatic Complaints, Anxiety, Anxiety 
Related Disorders, Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma Subscale, Depression, Paranoia,  
Schizophrenia, Borderline Features, Alcohol Problems, Drug Problems, Aggression, 
Suicidal Ideation, Stress, and Nonsupport.  
 
 The same procedure was repeated to compare the elevations for those in the 
trauma positive and trauma negative groups. Again consistent with PAI main effects 
results, there were no differences in the likelihood that trauma positive or trauma 
negative participants produced elevated PAI clinical, treatment, and interpersonal 
scales and no interactions were significant. See Table 10. It can be concluded, then, 
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Analyses of M-FAST Total Score and Subscales 
 
Like the TSI and PAI, a MANOVA with follow-up ANOVAs was used to detect 
group mean differences on the M-FAST. Again, overall differences for coaching were 
revealed for coaching, F(3, 112) = 3.969, p < .001 (Eta2 = .237), but not for trauma or 
the interaction of coaching and trauma. Omnibus differences were found for the M-
FAST Total score, F(3, 112) = 5.82, p < .01. Differences were also shown for the 
following M-FAST subscales: Reported/Observed, Extreme Symptomatology, Rare 
Symptom Combination, Unusual Hallucinations, Negative Self-image, and 
Suggestibility. There were no between-groups differences for the M-FAST Unusual 
Symptom Course subscale. Main effects revealed that coached simulators produced 
lower group mean scores than naive participants on each of the M-Fast Total and 
subscales Reported/Observed, Extreme Symptomatology, Rare Symptom Combination, 
Unusual Hallucinations, Negative Self-image, and Suggestibility. No main effects for 
trauma or interactions were significant for any of the M-FAST scales. See Tables 11 
and 12 and Figure 4. 
 
Analyses of Malingering Detection 
 
The primary purpose of this study was to compare the ability of participants to 
malinger PTSD.  In order to conduct this comparison, simulators had to be categorized 
by malingering status. Because, in clinical practice a successful malingerer would 
present with an honest response style and clinically significant elevation to suggest 
psychological distress, successful malingering was narrowly defined. First, no elevated 
validity scales were allowed because these could lead a clinician to conclude that a 
respondent was malingering. Therefore, validity scale scores on all tests were required 
to be below clinical cutoffs. Given the paucity of research on the M-FAST subscales, 
only the M-FAST Total score was used for this categorization.  Secondly, if no clinical 
elevations were present, then an evaluator would be unlikely to label someone as 
having PTSD. Without any symptoms, there could be no impairment as required by 
diagnostic criteria. Because the TSI lacks specific cutoffs for consideration of PTSD, a 
clinically elevated profile was operationally defined as two or more clinical scale 
elevations.  Two criteria were utilized for indicating PTSD symptomatology via the PAI: 
(1) elevation on the trauma subscale of the Anxiety Related Disorders clinical scale 
(“ARDT”), and (2) PTSD suggested as an Axis I diagnosis by the computer scored PAI 
interpretive report. 
 
In summary, successful malingering was operationally defined by the following 
criteria: (1) no elevations on M-FAST total score; (2) no elevations on  TSI ATR, INC, or 
RL scales; (3) no elevations on PAI INC, INF, NIM, PIM, or MI, scales; (4) at least two 
elevations on TSI clinical scales [represented by variable “TSI PTSD”]; (5) an elevated 
PAI ARDT scale; and (6) PTSD suggested as an Axis I diagnosis by PAI interpretive 
report [represented by variable “PAI PTSD”]. If all of these criteria were satisfied, a 
participant was labeled as a successful malingerer. This occurred with only four 
individuals (3.5%) in the entire sample (N=113).  Therefore, 97% of participants were 
accurately classified as malingering.  
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To evaluate these criteria, scores for all involved scales had to be recoded in a 
manner similar to that used with the TSI and PAI clinical scales for categorization as 
either above or below clinical cutoffs. The percentage of those who produced elevations 
in the coached groups was then compared the percentage of those who produced 
elevations in the naive groups and this was repeated for the trauma positive and 
negative groups using Pearson’s Chi2 analyses. Results are summarized in Tables 13 
and 14, respectively. The percentages of malingering success or failure rates can be 
seen in Figures 4 and 5. 
 
When looking at coaching status, a pattern of coached participants presenting 
with a lower percentage of elevations than naive simulators emerged for each of the 
following variables: M-FAST Total, TSI ATR, TSI PTSD, PAI ARDT, PAI NIM, PAI MI, 
and PAI PTSD. The opposite (coached>naive) occurred for TSI RL. All Chi2 values are 
shown in Table 13. There were no differences in the percentages of clinical elevations 
by coaching status for the TSI INC, PAI INC, PAI INF, or PAI PIM scales. No differences 
emerged for any of the aforementioned variables when trauma positive and negative 
groups were compared.  
 
Simulators who failed to meet the malingering criteria were categorized by what 
aspect of the data prevented their success. For example, participants who were 
unsuccessful malingerers were divided into two categories: (1) those who had invalid 
response styles as evidenced by one or more validity scale elevations, and (2) those 
who presented with a valid profile but failed to have clinical elevation suggesting 
requisite psychological distress.  These three groups (i.e., successful, unsuccessful 
because invalid, and unsuccessful because no elevation; this variable was labeled 
“malingering status”) were then compared with one another using Pearson’s Chi2 
analyses. As with TSI and PAI Chi2 analyses, these malingering groups were compared 
based on coaching status and trauma history.  Results are summarized in Tables 13 
and 14, respectively.  
 
A difference was present for malingering status by coaching, χ2(1, 112) = 8.24, p 
< .05, suggesting that coached participants were more likely to be successful 
malingerers than were naive respondents. The pattern of proportion of successful: 
unsuccessful because invalid: unsuccessful because no elevation, however, was similar 
for the coached and naive groups. Specifically, the majority of individuals in each group 
(77% for coached and 95% for naive) were unsuccessful malingerers because they 
presented with at least one elevated validity scale. Although no differences were 
present for malingering status by trauma history, the same pattern was repeated there 
as well.   
 
To examine the unsuccessful malingerers on a more detailed level, all possible 
combinations of reasons for being unsuccessful were explored. Differences were found 
for coaching [χ2(1, 112) = 26.88, p < .01] but not for trauma. It was shown that the most 
common reason for individuals to be unsuccessful due to presenting with invalid profiles 
was that they had elevations on at least one validity scale on all three (M-FAST, TSI, 
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and PAI) instruments (32% for coached, 68% for naive, 50% for trauma positive, and 
51% for trauma negative participants). The specifics of all other unsuccessful 
percentages can be found as “Detailed Malingering Status” in Tables 13 and 14.  
 
Individual Scale Analyses 
 
Finally, in an attempt to determine the effectiveness of validity scales at 
identifying malingered responses, all of the aforementioned recoded validity indices 
were examined across coaching and trauma groups. Because all participants were 
attempting to malinger, perfect detection rates would be 100% for each scale. The M-
FAST total score, PAI NIM, TSI ATR, PAI MI scales were the most effective in correctly 
classifying simulators. These scales, when analyzed independently, correctly 
categorized 68%, 59%, 58%, and 55% of simulators, respectively. The PAI INF scale 
accurately classified 23% of simulators. The TSI INC scale correctly labeled 13%, while 
the PAI INC scale categorized 9.7%. The TSI RL only identified 3.5% of feigners and 
the PAI PIM scale did not classify any respondent as malingering. Clearly, false 
negative rates (i.e., a lack of validity scale elevation with simulated responses) are of 




Summary of Results 
 
This is one of the few studies to employ a coaching design in PTSD simulation 
research. It is also the first to examine the potential impact of trauma history on feigning 
posttraumatic stress symptoms. Overall, this investigation demonstrated that providing 
simulators with diagnostic information on PTSD symptoms and strategies for avoiding 
detection on psychological validity indices (i.e., coaching) was effective in assisting 
simulators with presenting as if they were experiencing but not significantly 
exaggerating posttraumatic stress symptoms. This was manifest in group mean 
differences between coached and naive respondents on several validity and clinical 
scales across measures. Trauma history, on the other hand, did not impact simulators 
ability to feign PTSD symptoms in any meaningful way. Participants who experienced a 
traumatic event were not better able to feign PTSD than were those without any history 
of experiencing or witnessing a traumatic event. Furthermore, a positive trauma history 
did not mediate the exaggerated clinical presentation commonly seen with PTSD 
simulation research (e.g., Liljequist et al., 1998).  Also, no interactions between 
coaching and trauma history were detected, suggesting that coaching, alone, accounted 
for these differences. 
 
Coached participants had lower group mean scores and rates of being above 
clinical cutoffs than did naive simulators for the M-FAST Total, TSI ATR scale, and PAI 
NIM and MI scales. Despite these differences, coached participants were still not 
significantly better at avoiding malingering detection than were naive simulators. No 
differences were found between coached and naive simulators for the TSI INC, PAI 
INC, or PAI INF scales.  Specifically, naive and coached feigners were equally able to 
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present relatively consistent clinical profiles without endorsing different rates of 
symptoms so rare they are not often endorsed, even by persons with legitimate 
pathology. This is an important finding because an inconsistent profile can be a 
hallmark for suggesting malingering and few of these simulators would have been 
detected in this manner. 
 
Mean scores for all four groups were above the M-FAST cutoff (5), indicating that 
malingering would have been suggested by the M-FAST for over two thirds of all 
respondents. This provides evidence that the M-FAST can be an effective screening 
tool for malingering detection when PTSD symptoms are being presented. These 
results are consistent with previous research in which a coaching challenge was used 
with the M-FAST (e.g., Guriel et al., in press).  
 
Despite the differences between the coached and naive participants on validity 
and clinical scales, 97% of all simulators were correctly classified as malingering. Even 
respondents who were provided with PTSD symptom information and strategies for 
avoiding detection via psychological validity indices were no more successful in 
malingering PTSD than those who were given no such information. It should be 
acknowledged that using lower cut scores on M-FAST total or TSI or PAI subscales 
could increase the sensitivity of each measure in the detection of malingered PTSD. In 
clinical practice, however, this would also yield decreased specificity (i.e., higher false 
positive rates). 
 
Presenting with elevated validity indicators was the most common reason 
participants were classified as unsuccessful feigners (77% for the coached groups and 
95% for the naive). This is a testament to the inclusion of measures of response style 
within multiscale, self-report assessment measures.   
 
 These results support the idea of using a multi-method assessment approach 
when conducting forensic PTSD evaluations (e.g., Guriel & Fremouw, 2003). By 
combining a malingering specific interview with multi-scale inventories of posttraumatic 
and related clinical symptoms, clinicians may be able to correctly classify a large 
percentage of all feigning clients. This provides a useful framework from which forensic 




 Although this is one of the few studies to employ a coaching design in PTSD 
simulation research, several limitations must be acknowledged. First, this relatively 
small, homogeneous sample of college students provides limited generalizability. A 
larger, more heterogeneous sample, particularly of persons diagnosed with PTSD, may 
yield different results. Utilizing such a clinical comparison group may also account for 
the differences in test results between coached and naive groups. One way to test this 
would be to employ a mixed group validation procedure (i.e., validation groups are 
comprised of both individuals with and without pathology) as suggested by Frederick 
(2000). In addition to using a known PTSD group, comparison of simulators to a known 
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malingering group (as identified by the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms 
[SIRS; Rogers, 1992] or a similar measure of response style) would allow for analysis of 
the differences between true malingerers and simulators. Similarly, no honest 
responders were included in this study. This type of control group would provide a 
baseline of response for which comparison to the simulation groups could be made. 
Also, it is possible that there was at least some degree of experimenter bias because 
the examiners were aware that all participants were being asked to malinger. 
 
 No attempt was made to verify participants’ self-reported trauma history. As a 
result, it is possible that some of the trauma positive respondents did not actually 
experience traumatic events. Likewise, trauma negative individuals could have 
experienced an event that was not reported. Verification of the reported trauma should 
be attempted whenever possible, particularly in true clinical or forensic settings 
(Pankratz, 2003).  Even those who reported experiencing a traumatic event were 
relatively unlikely to endorse clinically significant impairment as a result of the trauma 
(as measured by the PDS screener; 26% for naive and 9% for coached respondents). 
This might indicate that these traumatic events were not particularly salient for 
respondents or that enough time had elapsed since the event (44% reported 6 months 
to 3 years) for posttraumatic symptoms to remit without intervention. Requiring 
participants to have fulfilled both criteria A1 and A2 (experiencing the event and feeling 
fear, helplessness, or horror, or concern for the well being of self or others at the time of 
the event) may have yielded different results for these trauma positive individuals.  
 
  In addition to the coaching instructional set, extra course credit and the chance at 
a $50 cash prize lottery were used as incentives for successful malingering. This 
methodology is similar to that of others who have used students with simulation designs 
(e.g., Edens et al., 1998; Liljequist et al., 1998; Storm & Graham, 2000). Still, these 
incentives are not an equivalent to more realistic settings in which incentives might 
include such salient reinforcers as lifetime disability benefits, public notoriety, or large 
financial settlements. The relative lack of incentive may have affected the motivation of 
participants, potentially resulting in a lower effort being put forth than what would be 
expected in a bona fide litigation situation. For a detailed discussion of the limitations of 
using coaching in simulation designs with a relative lack of incentives, see Rogers and 
Cruise (1998). 
 
 Also, though the coaching material was ecologically valid because part of it was 
obtained from the internet, a medium easily available to many PTSD litigants, the 
overall degree of coaching (approximately 15 minutes) was likely less than what would 
be found in a situation where respondents were more motivated to present with a PTSD 
profile. Tan, Slick, Strauss, and Hultsch (2002) caution that motivated malingerers do 
have access to information helpful to feigning psychopathology. More specifically,  
Wetter and Corrigan (1995) found that nearly 50% of attorneys and law students feel 
that they have a responsibility to inform their clients of the validity scales on 
psychological tests. It is unclear, however, how many actually provide their clients with 
any information about psychological assessments. 
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 This is the one of the few studies to use PTSD symptom coaching with the PAI 
(Calhoun et al., 2000; Liljequist et al., 1998; Scragg et al., 2000). Given that these 
studies used different levels and methods of coaching and different cutoff scores for 
validity indices, further investigation is warranted before the implications of such results 
can be extended outside a research context. Furthermore, this is the first study to use 
validity scale coaching with the PAI.  Most have involved the MMPI-2 (Bury & Bagby, 
2002; Lamb et al., 1994; Rogers et al., 1993; Storm & Graham, 2000). The MMPI-2 
validity scale coaching research has been inconsistent, making generalizations 
inappropriate and further investigation even more necessary. Because only a small 
number of empirical studies have tested the effects of validity scale coaching, further 
research must be conducted before findings can be generalized to any degree.  
 
 Moreover, aside from Edens et al. (1998) and Guriel et al. (in press), few 
researchers have employed coached simulation designs with either the M-FAST or the 
TSI, so replication and extension are clearly warranted. Because both of these 
measures are still being validated, it is important to assess their vulnerability to 
challenges such as coaching and trauma history.  This may be done by replicating 
earlier findings or by expanding the breadth of the results with research conducted by 
investigators other than the authors of these measures. It would also be useful to repeat 
these investigations with clinical populations including persons diagnosed with PTSD. 
Furthermore, investigation into whether using lower cutoff scores for forensic 
evaluations (as opposed to presumably less adversarial clinical assessments) would 
yield different results would be beneficial. 
 
Although participant knowledge was tested after coaching using a pre-test quiz, 
no post-test quiz was administered after completion of the M-FAST, TSI, and PAI. This 
leaves open the possibility that participants misunderstood the test instructions or forgot 
the coaching information while answering the TSI, PAI, and M-FAST. Inclusion of both 
pre- and post-test quizzes may have better addressed this concern. Similarly, assessing 
participants’ motivation to feign following completion of all measures could have 
provided more empirical evidence of the effort put forth during this simulation study.  
 
Although M-FAST administrators were generally not aware of the coaching or 
trauma history status of respondents, it is possible that the M-FAST interviewer may 
have been inadvertently aware of this because of their involvement with the entire 
laboratory phase process.  For this reason, it cannot be said that interviewers were fully 
masked to independent variable conditions. Perfect inter-rater reliability on the M-FAST, 
however, suggests that his did not affect results. It would have been preferable for M-
FAST administrators to be completely unaware of trauma history or coaching status. 
 
A further limitation of these results stems from the narrow, conservative definition 
of successful malingering used in this study. In order to be labeled a successful 
malingerer in this study, a participant had to avoid significant elevation on any of nine 
validity scales and present with clinical elevation on both the PAI and TSI. As a result, 
this may be overly restrictive in defining malingering in a clinical or forensic setting. For 
example, in an evaluation where a clinical interview and behavioral observations were 
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afforded a single validity scale elevation may be explained by reasons other than pure 
feigning. This is a particular concern since it is difficult to differentiate between 
malingered and genuine PTSD because an apparent overreporting of symptoms is 
thought to be associated with legitimate PTSD cases (Elhai et al., 2001; Hyer et al., 
1987; Resnick, 1997). This happens because PTSD has a high comorbidity with both 
clinical and personality disorders, making differential diagnosis a challenge (Keane, 
1995); and because PTSD, like other severe pathologies, may include a number of 
symptoms resulting in an elevated overall symptom profile (Hyer et al.).  
 
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, accurate estimates of the base rates of 
malingering are generally not known (Rogers, 1997). Making any comparisons or 
statistical estimates is a difficult endeavor when no empirical base rate exists. Further 
investigation into the base rates of malingering among PTSD claimants is needed.    
 
Implications and Future Directions 
 
Malingering is a critical issue in the assessment of posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) for several reasons. First, unlike most psychiatric conditions, PTSD requires 
that there be a cause and effect relation between a traumatic event and subsequent 
psychological sequelae. Given that clinicians are forced to rely heavily on subjective 
client self-reports in diagnosing PTSD (because the DSM criteria are dominated by 
subjective experiences), it has been argued that PTSD is easily faked (Elhai et al., 
2001; Frueh & Kinder, 1994; Lees-Haley, 1986). In attempting to feign postraumtic 
stress symptomatology, clients may completely fabricate their symptoms, exaggerate 
the extent of their injuries, or attribute pre-existing symptoms to the current trauma. 
Unfortunately, such behaviors are not uncommon (e.g., Resnick, 1997). 
 
Secondly, as previously mentioned, it is difficult to differentiate between 
malingered and genuine PTSD because endorsement of many different symptoms may 
be reflective of legitimate posttraumatic stress or comorbid Axis I and/or Axis II 
psychopathology (e.g., Keane, 1995). People may be motivated to feign PTSD to obtain 
financial compensation (McGuire, 1999; Lees-Haley 1992; Resnick, 1997), to receive 
treatment or gain inpatient status (e.g., Elhai et al., 2001), to embellish victimization 
(e.g., Resnick), or to reduce or avoid criminal liability (e.g., Baer & Miller, 2002; Melton 
et al., 1997). Finally, the potentially large incentives (monetary or otherwise) involved 
with PTSD claims may serve to increase motivation in a would-be malingerer or even in 
someone who would not ordinarily engage in such deceitful behavior. 
 
Coached participants were better able than naive respondents to present as if 
they were experiencing but not significantly exaggerating posttraumatic stress 
symptoms. Still, they were relatively ineffective at discriminating when to endorse or 
avoid symptoms in an attempt to produce a successfully malingered profile. This may 
be because the assessment measures used in this study are effective in identifying 
feigned psychopathology. It could also be accounted for, however, by the relative 
paucity of coaching. More intense, ecologically valid coaching (likely to be sought out by 
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more motivated simulators such as would likely be seen practice) may enable more 
successful malingerers. 
 
Use of a larger, more heterogeneous sample is also warranted for future 
research. It would be especially interesting to compare results on the measures used in 
this study for individuals who have experienced a single, time limited traumatic event, 
(e.g., one motor vehicle accident) with those who have repeatedly been traumatized 
(i.e., multiple events across time) and with those who have experienced a prolonged 
victimization (e.g., survivors of years of ongoing physical, sexual, or emotional abuse).  
 
Utilization of different cutoff scores for the scales and indices examined in this 
study may also produce different results. Cutoffs different from those suggested in 
respective test manuals may yield the best positive and negative predictive power (and 
subsequently overall classification rate) for malingering detection. Further research into 
this area is strongly encouraged. Results must be well disseminated, however, because 
most clinicians are likely to rely on procedures recommended in test manuals unless 
they are aware of the utility of alternate procedures.   
 
Analysis of the incremental validity of using these measures alone or in 
conjunction with one another may assist clinicians in deciding which assessments to 
use and in what order. It may be that using two of the three measures is equally 
effective to using all three in discriminating malingered PTSD. It is also possible that 
order in which these measures are used could impact the efficacy of identifying 
malingered PTSD.     
 
Lastly, this is one of only a few studies to employ a multi-assessment coaching 
design in PTSD simulation research and is the first to examine the potential impact of 
trauma history on malingered PTSD. Replication and extension are clearly needed. 
Similar investigation with other self-report measures of non-combat PTSD such as the 
recently validated PTSD Checklist-Civilian Version (see Ruggiero, Del Ben, Scotti, & 
Rabalais, 2003) is warranted. Similarly, replication of the coaching paradigm with other 
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Appendix A 
 
Institutional Review Board Approved Consent Form 
 
 
CONSENT AND INFORMATION FORM 
 
Title: Detection of Coached Malingering of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. 
  
Investigators: Jennifer Guriel, M.A., and William Fremouw, Ph.D., West Virginia University 
 
Introduction: I,         have been invited to 
participate in this research study, which has been explained to me by __________. I have been 
informed that this research is being conducted as a doctoral research project in the Department 
of Psychology at West Virginia University.  
 
Purposes of the Study: This study is designed to examine the ability of individuals with and 
without a trauma history (e.g., surviving or witnessing a car accident, flood, assault, etc.) to fake 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder when given coached instructions. 
 
Description of Procedures: This study involves answering questionnaires after watching an 
instructional film regarding symptoms of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.  I will also be asked to 
complete questionnaires regarding general psychological symptoms that I may or may not be 
experiencing.  This procedure will take approximately one to two hours to complete. I 
understand that I am not required to answer all questions and that I may view the questions 
before signing this consent form if I request to do so. Approximately 125 participants will be 
involved in this study. This phase of the study will take place in the laboratory of Dr. William 
Fremouw on the downtown campus of West Virginia University.  
 
Risks and Discomforts: There are no known or expected risks from participating in this phase 
of the study, aside from the time associated with completing the questionnaire and mild 
discomfort that may arise in response to being asked about psychological symptoms and 
personal experiences.   
 
Alternatives: I may choose not to participate in this study.  Payment, class standing or grades 
will not be affected by my refusal to participate or withdrawal from this study.  I understand that 
there are other methods of obtaining extra credit in my introductory psychology class.  I 
understand that these opportunities are listed on the Subject Recruitment Board near the main 
office in the Life Sciences Building and that my instructor can offer even more opportunities.  
 
Benefits: I understand that this study is not expected to be of direct benefit to me, but the 
knowledge gained may be of benefit to others.  I understand that, for participating, I will be paid 
$10.00 or receive two extra credit points in my introductory psychology class, but I understand 
that other options are available for earning extra credit.  
 
_______________            ______ 
Participant’s Initials             Date 
 
Rev. 09/12/02                     1 of 2 
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Consent and Information  
            Page 2 
 
Title: Detection of Coached Malingering of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. 
 
Financial Considerations: I understand that I will be paid $10.00 for participation in this phase 
of the study unless I am a student, in which case I will receive two extra course credit points. I 
also understand that if I successfully fake that I have Posttraumatic Stress Disorder I will be 
entered into a drawing for an additional $50 cash prize.  
 
Contact Persons: For more information about this research I can contact Jennifer L. Guriel, 
M.A. or her supervisor, William Fremouw, Ph.D., at 293-2001 ext. 662.  For more information on 
my rights as a research participant, I may contact the Executive Secretary of the Institutional 
Review Board of West Virginia University at (304) 293-7073. 
 
Confidentiality: I understand that any information about me obtained as a result of my 
participation in this research will be kept as confidential as legally possible. I understand also 
that my research records, just like hospital records, may be subpoenaed by court order or may 
be inspected by federal regulatory authorities. In any publications that result from this research, 
neither my name nor any information from which I might be identified will be published without 
my consent. 
 
Voluntary Participation: Participation in this study is completely voluntary. I understand that I 
am free to withdraw my consent to participate in this study at any time. I also understand that 
refusal to participate or withdrawal will involve no penalty or loss of benefits and will not affect 
my grades or class standing. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the 
research, and I have received answers concerning the areas I did not understand. 
 
Upon signing this form, I will receive a copy. 
 
I willingly consent to participate in this research. 
 
             
Signature of Participant     Date   Time 
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Because completion of surveys, such as the ones you just did, may make some persons realize 
that they are experiencing an uncomfortable level of worry or depression, the investigators in 
this study are providing all participating students this information form which lists several local 
mental health and counseling services that are available to them if they feel that they would like 
to talk with someone about their feelings. 
 
Additionally, participants may contact Jennifer Guriel, M.A. or William Fremouw , Ph.D. at 293-
2001 x 31662 for a copy of this list. 
 
This is a partial list of services in this area (Morgantown, WV) in case you feel that you need 
assistance.  Inclusion on this list does NOT imply endorsement of the agency by the 
investigators in this study, nor does it in any way imply that the investigators are financially 
responsible for any services requested or received as a result of participation in this study. 
 
Carruth Center for Counseling and Psychological Services* 
Student Services Center 
West Virginia University 
Morgantown, WV  26506 
(304) 293-4431 
 
Chestnut Ridge Hospital 
930 Chestnut Ridge Road 
Morgantown, WV  26505 
(304) 293-4000 
 
The Quin Curtis Center, Department of Psychology 
West Virginia University 
Morgantown, WV  26506 
(304) 293-2001, ext 31671 
 
Valley Comprehensive Community Mental Health Center 
301 Scott Avenue 
Morgantown, WV  26505 
(304) 296-1731 
 
The Vet Center (military veterans only) 
Greenbag Road 
Morgantown, WV  26505 
(304) 291-4303 
 
* Students who have paid WVU tuition and fees may receive services free of charge at this agency 
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Appendix B 










Experiencing or witnessing an event in which 
you perceive that your own or someone else’s 
life may be in danger
Examples include motor vehicle accidents, 




Experiencing the feelings that you had 
during the event again
Examples include acting or feeling as if it 
were happening all over again, having 
dreams or nightmares about the event, 
having upsetting thoughts or images 
come into your head, feeling scared, 
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A = Arousal
Experiencing physical reactions when you think 
of the event, being nervous or jumpy, having 
trouble sleeping, feeling mad or irritated
Examples include sweating, feeling like your 
heart is racing/pounding, feeling angry for no 
reason, having trouble falling asleep or waking 
up in the middle of the night, being jumpy or 
easily startled, feeling like you have to check 
to see who is behind you, feeling scared or 




Trying to stay away from people, places, or 
things that remind you of the event or trying not 
to remember things about the event
Examples include feeling alone or cut off from 
people around you, feeling like you cannot cry 
or have loving feelings, not being able to 
remember details of the event, having trouble 
concentrating, feeling hopeless about the future, 
trying not to think about or talk about the event, 
changing your routine so will not have to see 
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B = Bizarre
Do Not endorse overly BIZARRE or unusual 
symptoms
For example, do not say that you feel or do 
things that you have never heard of anyone 




Do Not endorse too many OBVIOUS items
For example, do not say that you 
experience every item that sounds like it 




Do Not endorse only items that are 
STEREOTYPICAL of PTSD
For example, do not endorse only things 
that most people think of when they hear 
PTSD (like having nightmares or avoiding 
the scene of the event). Instead, endorse 
these AND some of the PTSD symptoms 
that are not as well known (like not being 
able to cry or feel love).
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S = Severe
Do Not endorse too many SEVERE problems
For example, do not say that you have 
every bad symptom that is listed. Most 
people have one or two severe symptoms 
and the rest of their symptoms are minor. 
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Appendix C 




New Trends and Areas 
You Might Not Think of
 
FBI Agent
Research studies include interviewing 
perpetrators and victims of violent crime to 
increase knowledge and lead prevention 
programs
Salary range: $43,000 – $79,000
 
Microsoft
Research into the usability and 
“friendliness” of software and operating 
systems. Also employed by IBM, EBay,   
etc.
Salary range: “Very Competitive”
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Armed Forces
Assessment and treatment of military 
personnel and their families. Also includes 
research into the policies and procedures that 
the military develops and uses
Salary range: $30,000 – $40,000
 
Preventative Medicine
Development of materials and campaigns 
designed to inform the general public about 
disease and prevention. Also, consultation to 




Research and design of marketing 
campaigns to inform the public and increase 
a company’s sales
Salary range: $80,000 – $115,000 (Bayer)
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Congress
Counsel to Senator or Congressional 
representative. Meets with lobbyists, 
researches current issues, drafting 





Writing of grants to get highly competitive 
federal and private research funding
Salary range: $75,000 – $97,000




Research and Design of websites that are 
visually appealing and user friendly. Creation 
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Technical Writing
Editing and writing for scientific journals and 
magazines. Allows for many brief projects 























Participant#   
Quiz                       
 
1. Complete the following summary of PTSD criteria: 
  
T        
R        
A        
A        
 
 
2. Name 4 symptoms of PTSD: 
    
1.        
2.        
3.          
4.        
 
3. Name 3 of the 4 strategies for beating psychological tests: 
 
1.        
2.        
3.         
 
 
Please read the statement and circle whichever is appropriate for you: 
I have been instructed to: 
 
 
(A) Answer honestly during the psychology tests and interview 
 
(B) Pretend that I suffer from PTSD from a motor vehicle accident during the psychology 











Recruitment Ad #3 for HS# 15285 
NEED EXTRA CREDIT ??? 
If you are over 18 and have some free time, you may 
qualify to participate in a research study and be 
eligible to earn extra credit for your psychology class 
and be entered into a cash lottery. 
 
Participation in this research study is voluntary and 
will involve meeting with a psychology student for 
approximately 1-2 hours. During this time, you will 
watch a videotape and be asked to answer a number of 
questions. 
 
If you would like to learn more about this research 
study and how you can participate, please contact the 
principle investigator,  
Jennifer Guriel, M.A., at: 
(304) 293-2001 x 31662 or jguriel@mix.wvu.edu
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Footnotes 
 
1Though previous researchers have discussed results regarding the PAI 
Malingering Index (PAI MI) in terms of raw scores, this study utilized T-Scores 
(with T > 70 indicating elevation) for all analyses. This was done because the MI 
is now included in the LOGIT scoring program and no longer has to be calculated 
by hand.   
 
2The PDS uses a one-month time specifier. For the purposes of this study, this 
constraint was waived and participants were asked to report on symptoms that 
were experienced any time over one month post-event. This was done to 
increase the attainability of the sample, while ruling out acute stress disorder.  
 
3For Chi2 analyses, raw data were used as the expected values for all 
calculations. Percentages are presented in the results section and in tables and 
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Table 1 















































































































Note. M-FAST = Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test; TSI = Trauma 
Symptom Inventory; ATR = Atypical Responding; INC = Inconsistency; RL = Response 
Level; PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; INC = Inconsistency; INF = 
Infrequency; NIM = Negative Impression Management; PIM = Positive Impression 
Management; MI = Malingering Index.  
M-FAST scores are reported as Raw Scores; All others are T-Scores 
Means in the same row that do not share superscripts differ. 
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Table 2 



























































Note. M-FAST = Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test; TSI = Trauma 
Symptom Inventory; ATR = Atypical Responding; INC = Inconsistency; RL = Response 
Level; PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; ARDT = Anxiety Related Disorders, 
Trauma; INC = Inconsistency ; INF = Infrequency; NIM = Negative Impression 
Management; PIM = Positive Impression Management; MI = Malingering Index.  
M-FAST scores are reported as Raw Scores; All others are T-Scores 
Means in the same row that do not share superscripts differ. 
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Table 3 



















































































































Note. TSI = Trauma Symptom Inventory; AA = Anxious Arousal; DEP = Depression;  
ANG = Anger/Irritability; INTR = Intrusive Experiences; DA = Defensive Avoidance; 
DISS = Dissociation; SEXC = Sexual Concerns; DYSSEX = Dysfunctional Sexual 
Behavior; ISR = Impaired Self Reference; TRB = Tension Reduction Behavior.  
All reported scores are T-Scores. 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 4 
TSI Clinical Subscale Main Effects 































































Note. TSI = Trauma Symptom Inventory; AA = Anxious Arousal; DEP = Depression; 
ANG = Anger/Irritability; INTR = Intrusive Experiences; DA = Defensive Avoidance; 
DISS = Dissociation; SEXC = Sexual Concerns; DYSSEX = Dysfunctional Sexual 
Behavior; ISR = Impaired Self Reference; TRB = Tension Reduction Behavior.  
All reported scores are T-Scores. 
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Table 5 
 
Percent of Participants with Elevated TSI Clinical Scales by Coaching 
















AA 30% 70% 17.92*** .398 
DEP 27% 67% 18.04*** .400 
ANG 25% 51% 8.02** .266 
INTR 50% 74% 6.72* .244 
DA 30% 65% 13.52*** .346 
DISS 34% 77% 21.43*** .436 
SEXC 21% 49% 9.47** .290 
DYSSEX 43% 58% 2.56 .150 
ISR 20% 54% 14.60*** .359 
TRB 46% 72% 7.61** .260 
 
Note. TSI = Trauma Symptom Inventory; AA = Anxious Arousal; DEP = Depression; 
ANG = Anger/Irritability; INTR = Intrusive Experiences; DA = Defensive Avoidance; 
DISS = Dissociation; SEXC = Sexual Concerns; DYSSEX = Dysfunctional Sexual 
Behavior; ISR = Impaired Self Reference; TRB = Tension Reduction Behavior.  
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Table 6 
 


















AA 56% 43% 2.00 .133 
DEP 52% 40% 1.36 .110 
ANG 41% 34% .549 .070 
INTR 68% 53% 2.62 .152 
DA 53% 40% 1.75 .124 
DISS 61% 49% 1.52 .116 
SEXC 35% 36% .021 .014 
DYSSEX 53% 47% .425 .061 
ISR 38% 36% .034 .017 
TRB 61% 57% .114 .032 
 
Note. TSI = Trauma Symptom Inventory; AA = Anxious Arousal; DEP = Depression; 
ANG = Anger/Irritability; INTR = Intrusive Experiences; DA = Defensive Avoidance; 
DISS = Dissociation; SEXC = Sexual Concerns; DYSSEX = Dysfunctional Sexual 
Behavior; ISR = Impaired Self Reference; TRB = Tension Reduction Behavior.  
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Table 7 
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Note. PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; SOM = Somatic Complaints ANX = 
Anxiety; ARD = Anxiety Related Disorders; ARDT = Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma; 
DEP = Depression; MAN = Mania; PAR = Paranoia; SCZ = Schizophrenia; BORD = 
Borderline Features; ANT = Antisocial Features; ALC = Alcohol Problems; DRG= Drug 
Problems; AGG = Aggression ; SUI = Suicidal Ideation; STR = Stress; NON = 
Nonsupport; RXR = Treatment Rejection; Dom = Dominance; WRM = Warmth. 
All reported scores are T-Scores. 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 8 
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Note. PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; SOM = Somatic Complaints ANX = 
Anxiety; ARD = Anxiety Related Disorders; ARDT = Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma; 
DEP = Depression; MAN = Mania; PAR = Paranoia; SCZ = Schizophrenia; BORD = 
Borderline Features; ANT = Antisocial Features; ALC = Alcohol Problems; DRG= Drug 
Problems; AGG = Aggression ; SUI = Suicidal Ideation; STR = Stress; NON = 
Nonsupport; RXR = Treatment Rejection; Dom = Dominance; WRM = Warmth. 
All reported scores are T-Scores. 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 9 
 



















SOM 27% 74% 24.85*** .469 
ANX 57% 81% 7.333** .255 
ARD 46% 81% 14.35*** .356 
ARDT 52% 75% 6.84** .246 
DEP 52% 79% 9.22** .286 
MAN 11% 11% .001 .003 
PAR 38% 63% 7.44** .257 
SCZ 30% 68% 16.37*** .381 
BORD 32% 74% 19.57*** .416 
ANT 30% 47% 3.44 .174 
ALC 46% 70% 6.56* .241 
DRG 41% 60% 3.90* .186 
AGG 20% 47% 9.73** .293 
SUI 25% 63% 16.67*** .384 
STR 20% 56% 15.96*** .376 
NON 27% 47% 5.12* .213 
RXR 0% 0% N/A N/A 
DOM 5% 0% 3.14 .167 
WRM 0% 0% N/A N/A 
 
Note. PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; SOM = Somatic Complaints ANX = 
Anxiety; ARD = Anxiety Related Disorders; ARDT = Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma; 
DEP = Depression; MAN = Mania; PAR = Paranoia; SCZ = Schizophrenia; BORD = 
Borderline Features; ANT = Antisocial Features; ALC = Alcohol Problems; DRG= Drug 
Problems; AGG = Aggression ; SUI = Suicidal Ideation; STR = Stress; NON = 
Nonsupport; RXR = Treatment Rejection; Dom = Dominance; WRM = Warmth. 
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Table 10 
 





















SOM 55% 45% 1.07 .097 
ANX 65% 74% 1.11 .099 
ARD 64% 64% .000 .002 
ARDT 67% 60% .597 .073 
DEP 67% 64% .098 .029 
MAN 9% 13% .391 .059 
PAR 53% 47% .425 .061 
SCZ 52% 47% .243 .046 
BORD 59% 45% 2.29 .142 
ANT 44% 32% 1.67 .122 
ALC 62% 53% .901 .089 
DRG 52% 49% .073 .025 
AGG 35% 32% .106 .031 
SUI 47% 40% .477 .065 
STR 38% 38% .002 .004 
NON 36% 38% .044 .020 
RXR 0% 0% N/A N/A 
DOM 3% 2% .087 .028 
WRM 0% 0% N/A N/A 
 
Note. PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; SOM = Somatic Complaints ANX = 
Anxiety; ARD = Anxiety Related Disorders; ARDT = Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma; 
DEP = Depression; MAN = Mania; PAR = Paranoia; SCZ = Schizophrenia; BORD = 
Borderline Features; ANT = Antisocial Features; ALC = Alcohol Problems; DRG= Drug 
Problems; AGG = Aggression ; SUI = Suicidal Ideation; STR = Stress; NON = 
Nonsupport; RXR = Treatment Rejection; Dom = Dominance; WRM = Warmth. 
All reported scores are T-Scores. 
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Table 11 



































































































































































M-FAST = Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test 
All reported scores are Raw Scores. 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 12  
 

































































































M-FAST = Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test 
All reported scores are Raw Scores. 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 13  
 
Percent of Participants with Elevated Scales by Coaching Condition 
 













52% 84% 13.68*** .348 
TSI ATR 
(61+) 
32% 82% 29.27*** .509 
TSI INC 
(65+) 
13% 14% .058 .023 
TSI RL 
(65+) 
7% 0% 4.22* .193 
TSI PTSD 
(2+ elevations) 
64% 86% 7.12** .251 
PAI  ARDT 
(70+) 
52% 75% 6.84** .246 
PAI  INC 
(70+) 
7% 12% .849 .357 
PAI  INF 
(70+) 
20% 26% .710 .399 
PAI NIM 
(70+) 
43% 75% 12.42*** .332 
PAI PIM 
(70+) 
0% 0% N/A N/A 
PAI MI 
(70+) 
39% 70% 10.88** .310 
PAI PTSD 
(Diagnosis Suggested) 
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Note. M-FAST = Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test; TSI = Trauma 
Symptom Inventory; ATR = Atypical Responding; INC = Inconsistency; RL = Response 
Level; TSI PTSD = At least two clinical scale elevations on TSI; PAI = Personality 
Assessment Inventory; ARDT = Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma; INC = 
Inconsistency ; INF = Infrequency; NIM = Negative Impression Management; PIM = 
Positive Impression Management; MI = Malingering Index; PAI PTSD = PTSD was 
suggested in the diagnostic constellations of the PAI interpretive report; S = Successful 
Malingerer; I = Invalid on at least one validity scale; NE = No elevations to suggest 
PTSD symptomatology; IPT = Invalid PAI + TSI; IM = Invalid M-FAST; ITM = Invalid TSI 
+ M-FAST; IT = Invalid TSI; IPM = Invalid PAI + M-FAST; IP = Invalid PAI; IPTM = 
Invalid PAI + TSI + M-FAST; NET = No Elevations on TSI; NEP = PAI does not suggest 
PTSD; NETP = No Elevations on TSI + PAI does not suggest PTSD. 
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Table 14 
 
Percent of Participants with Elevated Scales or Who Meet Criteria by Trauma 
 




















70% 66% .177 .040 
TSI ATR 
(61+) 
61% 53% .618 .074 
TSI INC 
(65+) 
11% 17% .981 .093 
TSI RL 
(65+) 
3% 4% .121 .033 
TSI PTSD 
(2+ elevations) 
80% 68% 2.199 .139 
PAI  ARDT 
(70+) 
67% 60% .597 .073 
PAI  INC 
(70+) 
14% 4% 2.75 .156 
PAI  INF 
(70+) 
20% 28% .983 .093 
PAI NIM 
(70+) 
64% 53% 1.24 .105 
PAI PIM 
(70+) 
0% 0% N/A N/A 
PAI MI 
(70+) 










































Note. M-FAST = Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test; TSI = Trauma 
Symptom Inventory; ATR = Atypical Responding; INC = Inconsistency; RL = Response 
Level; TSI PTSD = At least two clinical scale elevations on TSI; PAI = Personality 
Assessment Inventory; ARDT = Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma; INC = 
Inconsistency ; INF = Infrequency; NIM = Negative Impression Management; PIM = 
Positive Impression Management; MI = Malingering Index; PAI PTSD = PTSD was 
suggested in the diagnostic constellations of the PAI interpretive report; S = Successful 
Malingerer; I = Invalid on at least one validity scale; NE = No elevations to suggest 
PTSD symptomatology; IPT = Invalid PAI + TSI; IM = Invalid M-FAST; ITM = Invalid TSI 
+ M-FAST; IT = Invalid TSI; IPM = Invalid PAI + M-FAST; IP = Invalid PAI; IPTM = 
Invalid PAI + TSI + M-FAST; NET = No Elevations on TSI; NEP = PAI does not suggest 
PTSD; NETP = No Elevations on TSI + PAI does not suggest PTSD. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Mean T scores (M-FAST raw scores) of validity indices across conditions. 
Figure 2. Mean T scores of TSI clinical scales across conditions. 
Figure 3. Mean T scores of PAI clinical, treatment, and interpersonal scales across 
conditions. 
Figure 4. Mean M-FAST raw scores across conditions. 
Figure 5. Malingering status percentages for trauma positive groups. 
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Figure 6 
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